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Abstract: Competitive dynamics research has focused primarily on interactions between dyads 
of firms. Drawing on the awareness-motivation-capability framework and strategic group theory 
we extend this by proposing that firms‟ actions are influenced by perceived competitive pressure 
resulting from actions by several rivals. We predict that firms‟ action magnitude is influenced by 
the total number of rival actions accumulating in the market, and that this effect is moderated by 
strategic group membership. We test this using data on the German mobile telephony market and 
find them supported: the magnitude of firm‟s actions is influenced by a buildup of actions by 
multiple rivals, and firms react more strongly to strategically similar rivals. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Deutsche Telekom’s price cuts were a reaction to the price decline in the German market for 
mobile telephony. – Handelsblatt 12/2005 
In many industries firms constantly have to defend themselves against rival attacks on their 
competitive position (Smith et al., 1991, 2001). In turn, their actions may provoke retaliation 
from their rivals, further fuelling competition (Chen et al., 1992; Yu and Cannella, 2007). The 
outcomes of competitive interactions determine competitive advantage and thus profitability 
(Chen and Hambrick, 1995; Ferrier, 2001), so understanding their underlying mechanisms is 
central to competitive analysis and strategic management research in general (Chen, 1996; 
Ketchen et al., 2004; Smith et al. 2001). 
In the past two decades competitive dynamics research has analyzed competitive behavior 
between rival firms at the level of individual competitive actions (Ketchen et al., 2004; 
Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009). A central question in this research is which factors induce 
firms to make competitive moves (Chen and Miller, 1994; Ferrier et al., 1999, 2002). Focusing 
on action-reaction dyads, i.e. matching pairs of actions and responses, scholars found evidence 
that firms are affected by their rivals‟ actions (Smith et al., 1992; Chen et al., 1992; Chen and 
MacMillan, 1992; Chen et al., 2007). 
The action-reaction dyad is useful in providing a clear link between individual actions and 
responses, but it implies two strong assumptions, as first noted by Hsieh and Chen (2010): First, 
managers perceive actions by rival firms individually and not to evaluate them jointly. Second, 
each response is targeted towards an individual rival action, not towards several rivals at once. 
These assumptions are useful in situations with few similar rivals, but in industries with many 
heterogeneous players this concept of competition may be too narrow. Consequently, we ask if 
competitive actions by multiple rivals also jointly influence firm actions (Hsieh and Chen, 2010). 
Specifically, we ask whether firms‟ competitive moves are influenced by the gradual buildup 
of actions by multiple rivals over time and if there are differences between reactions within the 
same strategic group and across different groups. Based on the awareness-motivation-capability 
(AMC) framework (Chen and Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996) we propose that as they observe an 
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increasing buildup of rival moves their firms‟ last action managers perceive increasing 
„competitive pressure‟, i.e. a perceived necessity to take competitive action. Drawing on work on 
rivalry in strategic groups we study the moderating effect of strategic group membership on their 
reactions to multiple rivals (Porac and Thomas, 1990, Reger and Huff, 1993; Ferrier et al., 1999; 
Chen and Hambrick, 1995). We propose that in managers‟ cognitive constructions of the 
competitive landscape they perceive actions by strategically similar rivals as especially salient, 
leading to greater competitive pressure (Porac et al., 1995, Nath and Gruca, 1997) 
We address these questions by examining action magnitude as a central attribute of 
competitive moves (Smith et al., 1992), using data on tariff setting in the German cellular 
telephony market. We propose that greater competitive pressure leads to greater magnitude of 
firms‟ subsequent actions, specifically the number of tariffs introduced.1 Our empirical results 
support our theoretical arguments: in general, the more actions that have accumulated in the 
market since a firm‟s last competitive move, the greater that move‟s magnitude. We also find 
that the effect of rival actions on action magnitude is moderated by firm type: challengers react 
more strongly (even exclusively) to rival challengers‟ actions, and incumbents react to rival 
incumbents‟ actions. We conclude that competitive pressure and the link to rivalry in strategic 
groups provide a promising new perspective on competitive dynamics. 
By analyzing firms‟ reactions to multiple rivals this study complements Hsieh and Chen 
(2010) in introducing a new perspective of competitive interactions. It also contributes to theory 
by discussing how awareness, motivation and capability influence competitive pressure, thus 
extending the AMC framework to rivalry between a firm and groups of competitors (Chen and 
Miller, 1994; Chen, 1996). Finally, it provides a further link between competitive behavior and 
strategic group research by demonstrating that firms react differently to rival actions from within 
or outside their own strategic group (Cool and Dierickx, 1993; Porac and Thomas, 1994; Porac et 
al., 1995; Smith et al., 1997; Leask and Parker, 2007). 
                                                 
1
 However, we neither propose nor observe a snowballing „Red Queen‟ effect (Barnett and Sorenson, 2002). 
This is discussed below. 
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The paper is structured as follows: we first develop our theoretical framework and derive 
hypotheses. We then present the data and research methods, and report our empirical results. We 
then draw conclusions and identify directions for future research. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
Competitive Pressure 
Competitive interaction consists of „externally directed, specific, and observable competitive 
move[s] initiated by a firm to enhance its relative competitive position‟ (Smith et al., 2001: 321). 
Consequently, competitive moves are at the heart of competitive dynamics research. Scholars 
studied how competitive moves are shaped by characteristics of the acting firm, e.g. size and past 
performance, as well as by industry characteristics, e.g. buffering from competition and industry-
life-cycle (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Ferrier et al., 2002; Más-Ruiz et al., 2005; Fjeldstad et 
al., 2004). The main focus, however, is on inter-firm interaction, i.e. how a firm‟s competitive 
moves are driven by their rivals‟ behavior (Bettis and Weeks, 1987; Smith et al., 2001). 
Most work on these interactions studies action-reaction dyads consisting of a matching pair: 
an action and a reaction in direct response (for example a firm launching a new product and a 
competitor responding with a price cut) and are typically identified through content analysis of 
third-party reports or newspapers (Chen et al., 1992; Yu and Cannella, 2007). By linking 
competitive actions and reactions many studies establish a clear connection between competing 
firms‟ moves and previous rival actions (Smith et al., 2001; Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009). 
However, inherent in the main advantage of the action-reaction dyad approach – the fact that 
it allows a clear identification of matching pairs of competitive moves – is also a potential 
drawback. As pointed out by Hsieh and Chen (2010), it implies two strong assumptions about 
competitive interactions. First, it assumes that firms perceive each rival action individually and 
are unaware of (or disregard) potential interdependencies. Second, it assumes that firms‟ 
reactions are exclusively responses to individual actions by specific rivals and never to multiple 
actions at once. In mature industries with a small number of highly visible rivals these 
assumptions may hold, but in dynamic markets with a large number of firms they seem 
excessively restrictive. There, it seems more plausible that only some of a firm‟s actions are 
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direct responses to an attack by an individual competitor whereas others may be directed towards 
several rivals at once as the firm attempts to improve its relative competitive position.  
In this paper we develop an alternative perspective of competitive interaction to complement 
the action-reaction dyad. We propose that firms perceive the sum of all rival actions in the 
market jointly: as each firm observes its rivals‟ actions accumulate since its last competitive 
move it faces an increased threat of finding itself at a competitive disadvantage and consequently 
is increasingly motivated to react. We call the perceived necessity to act through a summary 
evaluation of multiple rivals‟ actions „competitive pressure‟, going back to Porter‟s description 
of competitive interaction (1980: 17). We predict that competitive pressure influences firm 
behavior, i.e. that firms make competitive moves in response to „the aggregate impact of multiple 
rivals' actions‟ (Hsieh and Chen, 2010: 3). 
We use the term „competitive pressure‟ to distinguish the concept from „perceived 
competitive tension‟, defined by Chen et al. (2007: 103) as, „the extent to which a firm‟s 
managers and industry stakeholders consider a given rival to be the focal firm‟s primary 
competitor‟. As discussed by Chen et al. (2007), competitive tension is a dyad-level construct, 
i.e. it describes the (possibly asymmetric) perceived relationship between a pair of rival firms. In 
contrast, competitive pressure describes a perceived relationship between a firm and its entire 
competitive environment. Thus it complements the concept of competitive tension. 
Ferrier and Lee (2002) compare the exchange of competitive actions between firms to 
fighters exchanging punches in a boxing match. To describe competitive pressure we propose a 
different sporting metaphor: firms are like runners in a race where each individual competes 
against all the others, although intermittently he or she may put in a burst of speed to improve the 
competitive position. 
Awareness-Motivation-Capability Framework 
To investigate how firms perceive competitive pressure and how it affects their actions we 
draw on the awareness-motivation-capability (AMC) framework.
2
 The AMC framework has its 
                                                 
2
 To be precise we investigate how managerial teams perceive competitive pressure. As our focus is not on 
micro-processes within firms we use “firm” as shorthand for the groups of managers perceiving pressure. 
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origins in psychology and is used frequently in competitive dynamics research (Chen and 
MacMillan, 1992; Chen, 1996; Smith et al., 2001). It suggests that firms will respond to rivals‟ 
actions if three conditions are met: they must be aware of the moves, motivated to respond to 
them, and they must possess the necessary capabilities to do so. 
Competitive pressure depends on a firm‟s awareness of rival moves and its motivation to 
respond to them. If a firm is unaware of rival actions it cannot perceive a need to respond, 
motivated though it may be (Chen and Miller, 1994). If a firm is aware of rival actions but not 
motivated to respond, e.g. because they are not perceived as threatening, it will also not perceive 
competitive pressure. However, if a firm is both aware of rival actions and motivated to respond, 
we propose that it will feel the need to respond, or „competitive pressure‟. 
While a buildup of rival moves influences awareness and motivation, there is no immediate 
reason why it should influence a firm‟s capability to respond (at least in the short run). We 
therefore do not hypothesize about the influence of capability on competitive pressure. 
Our argument is threefold: first, competitive pressure can arise from a firm‟s awareness of 
and motivation to respond to a buildup of actions by one or more rivals. Second, firms will seek 
to relieve competitive pressure by making competitive moves. Third, these moves may be 
directed towards several rivals at once. This argument is consistent with the finding by Hsieh and 
Chen (2010) that an increasing number of rival actions increases the likelihood that a firm will 
make a competitive move to protect its competitive position, and with Reger and Huff (1993) 
who show that managers‟ actions are influenced by perceived rivalry.  
Most previous research on competitive dynamics has abstracted from reactions to multiple 
rivals, focusing on action-reaction dyads (Smith et al., 2001; Hsieh and Chen, 2010). Thus, the 
argument made above adds to our understanding of competitive processes by describing how 
competitive moves by multiple rivals jointly influence a firm‟s action.  
Competitive Pressure and Action Magnitude 
We focus on one central aspect of firms‟ competitive moves, their magnitude. Action 
magnitude is interesting for two reasons: first, it provides an indication of how large a 
competitive impact the firm is attempting to achieve. Second, it is a proxy for how much effort 
and risk an action implies for a firm: large actions require more resources to implement and are 
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less easily reversible (Smith et al., 1992; Chen and MacMillan, 1992). As argued above, a firm 
observing a buildup of rival actions since its last action will perceive increasing competitive 
pressure. Eventually the pressure will become so great that the firm will attempt to relieve it 
through a competitive move. We propose that a firm perceiving more competitive pressure will 
both try to make its action count for more (i.e. have more impact on its relative competitive 
position), and be more willing to accept greater cost and risk. This is consistent with the finding 
in the study by Bothner et al. (2007) that racing drivers take greater risks if their competitive 
position is threatened by rivals. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
[H1] The greater the number of rival actions since a firm’s last competitive 
move, the greater the magnitude of its next move. 
The proposed effects and the related constructs of awareness, motivation, and capability are 
illustrated in Figure 1. The moderating influence of firm type is discussed in more detail below. 
An alternative mechanism to the one we propose is also conceivable: instead of reacting to 
rival actions directly, firms may instead be observing only their bottom line and reacting to 
changes there which in turn may be caused by rival actions. In our empirical setting the two 
mechanisms are observationally indistinct, but the data suggest this alternative explanation is 
highly unlikely. We observe telecommunications firms introducing tariffs every 2 to 5 months, 
and a bottom line effect from rival actions in such a short time would imply an extremely high 
degree of price elasticity. As Grzybowski and Pereira (2008) find that the German market for 
mobile telephony is inelastic (elasticity of -0.38 for calls), we are confident that our results are 
not strongly influenced by this alternative mechanism. Nevertheless, disentangling the two 
effects in other markets may be an interesting direction for future research. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Moderating Effect of Firm Type 
Firms react to competitive moves by multiple rivals. However, not all rival moves are equal: 
the strength of a firm‟s reactions may differ for different rivals and different actions. For 
example, certain actions may be more visible and motivate more responses, for example those 
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that particularly threaten a firm's key markets (Chen et al., 1992). Another possibility – and our 
focus – is that firms feel greater pressure from certain groups of rivals than from others. Indeed, 
there is evidence that firms perceive a different degree of rivalry towards different competitors 
(Porac and Thomas, 1990; Chen et al., 2007; Kilduff et al., 2010; Marcel et al., 2011).  
Porter (1979) proposed that rivalry may differ between groups of competitors with similar 
strategies. Although the strategic group concept has been debated (Hatten and Hatten, 1987; 
Barney and Hoskisson, 1990; Tang and Thomas, 1992) there is evidence that strategic groups do 
affect rivalry. For example, Cool and Dierickx (1993) find that in the early stages of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical industry, firm rivalry within the same strategic group was stronger than between 
firms in different groups. Strategic groups have also been found to directly influence firms‟ 
competitive actions (Smith et al., 1997; Más-Ruiz et al., 2005; Fernández and Usero, 2009). 
One possible reason for the effect of strategic similarity on competitive behavior is that it 
may shape the way managers perceive competitive rivalry (Porac and Thomas, 1990; Reger and 
Huff, 1993; Porac et al., 1995; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). Reger and Huff (1993) argue that 
managers consciously or unconsciously group competitors to make sense of complex 
competitive situations, that these groups are distributed and adapted through managerial 
interaction and that this leads to a shared perception of „cognitive strategic groups‟. Related work 
by Porac and coauthors finds that firms consider others that are similar in some key attributes as 
close rivals and adjust their competitive behavior accordingly (Porac et al., 1989; Porac and 
Thomas, 1990, 1994). In particular, in one study „large firms rivaled large firms and small firms 
rivaled small firms.‟ (Porac et al., 1995:224). 
We therefore propose that the competitive pressure experienced by a firm may depend on 
whether the actions it observes are made by rivals within or outside its own strategic group.
3
  We 
draw on strategic group theory and the awareness-motivation-capability framework to investigate 
exactly how group membership influences competitive pressure. 
First, we propose that firms are more likely to be aware of actions by rivals in their own 
strategic group. This is because in complex market situations managers construct simplified 
                                                 
3
 We do not distinguish between the concepts of „strategic‟ and „competitive‟ groups (Leask and Parker, 2007). 
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models of the competitive arena to make appropriate strategic decisions. Research based on 
cognitive and social learning theories provides significant evidence that they do so by focusing 
on a few similar firms (Porac et al., 1995; Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). 
Strategic group membership may also affect firms‟ motivation to respond to rival actions for 
several reasons. First, social learning theory suggests that a strong strategic group identity may 
lead to a myopic view of competition (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997), causing firms to disregard 
actions by rivals from other strategic groups as they do not perceive them as threatening (Porac 
et al., 1995). Second, strategic group membership may influence firms‟ motivation to respond 
due to market similarity. For example, Chen (1996) argues that managers perceive competitive 
actions by rivals with similar markets as particularly threatening. Third, firms in the same 
strategic group are likely to have similar resource bases, giving them the capability to contest 
with rivals. Although it has been argued that this might decrease motivation (Young et al., 2000), 
Chen et al. (2007) find that greater capability to contest leads to a greater perception of 
competitive tension between pairs of firms. This is because stakeholders view them as direct 
competitors and also because they are likely to compete for resources, and we propose the same 
holds for competitive pressure. In summary, we propose that due to social group perception, 
greater market commonality and greater capability to contest, managers are more motivated to 
respond to actions by rivals from their own strategic group. 
Besides being motivated, firms in the same strategic group are likely to have the necessary 
capability to react to each other‟s actions as they will tend to have similar resources, similar 
interpretations of the competitive landscape and possibly even overlapping identity domains 
(Chen, 1996; Porac and Thomas 1990; Chen et al., 2007; Livengood and Reger, 2010). 
Several dimensions have been proposed (and extensively discussed) to identify strategic 
groups (McGee and Thomas, 1986; Ketchen and Shook, 1996). A common distinction is 
between incumbents and challengers in an industry (Porter, 1979; Máz-Ruiz et al., 2005; 
Fernández and Usero, 2009). Incumbents are typically larger, hold dominant relative market 
positions, and possess significant captive resources, while challengers are typically smaller and 
have less market power and resources (Ferrier et al., 1999). Since cognitive strategic groups 
correspond to groups based on archival measures like size (Nath and Gruca, 1997; Chen et al., 
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2007), we propose that the argument above holds for rivalrous behavior between challengers and 
incumbents, and use this distinction in our empirical analysis.  
Our second argument is therefore that as managers observe rival actions accumulating in the 
market, they experience greater competitive pressure from actions by rivals in their own strategic 
group (of their own type). Building on our first hypothesis that greater competitive pressure leads 
to greater action magnitude, this leads to our second and third hypotheses: 
[H2] The magnitude of an incumbent’s competitive moves is more strongly 
influenced by other incumbents’ than by challengers’ actions. 
[H3] The magnitude of a challenger’s competitive moves is more strongly 
influenced by other challengers’ than by incumbents’ actions. 
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
Our dataset covers the German market for mobile telephony during the period from June 
2005 to February 2009. It contains monthly observations of all tariffs offered by all firms in the 
market. The data was collected by teltarif, a price-comparison website for telephone and 
broadband tariffs, and subjected to extensive cleaning.
4
 
The market for mobile telephony is especially well suited for our research questions for two 
reasons. First, tariffs in this market constitute both the price and the product offered by the firms. 
In the period under consideration there were no longer significant differences in coverage or call 
quality between the mobile network providers in the German market. Creating tariffs was 
therefore one of the main means of differentiation except advertising (German Federal Network 
Authority, 2009:74). Miravete (2009) supports this point: he finds evidence in the US mobile 
telephony market that nonlinear tariffs like the ones considered here are indeed strategic 
complements (i.e. a means for differentiation). 
                                                 
4
 The most important data cleaning steps are described in the Appendix. 
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Second, the industry structure in Germany during our study period allows lets us clearly 
identify incumbents and challengers. The incumbents in the market are the four large mobile 
network operators (MNOs) that entered the market the 90‟s and together hold approximately 
85% market share (T-Mobile, Vodafone, E-Plus and O2). The challengers are 34 small mobile 
virtual network operators (MVNOs) that enter the market from 2005 onwards and operate 
partially locally and partially at a national level. Besides the difference in entry timing and 
market share the incumbents and challengers also differ with regard to resources. MNOs are 
vertically integrated, owning and operating their own infrastructure. In contrast, MVNOs buy 
airtime from MNOs and use it to construct new tariffs that are sold under their own brand.  
A third group of companies in the market, seventeen tariff resellers, were excluded from the 
analysis. They operate mainly as an independent distribution platform for MNO tariffs and a 
large proportion of their offering comprises MNO tariffs sold under a joint brand. Including them 
in the analysis would artificially inflate the number of tariffs in the market. It could also produce 
a spurious effect: tariff resellers routinely offer bundles of new tariffs shortly after activity by 
MNOs, but this is merely a result of including the new MNO tariffs in their portfolios. 
Although tariffs are obviously targeted at different consumer segments, e.g. occasional 
callers and heavy usage business consumers, the dataset initially lacked a classification of market 
segments. We therefore allocate each tariff to one of four market segments (subsequently 
referred to as „markets‟) using standardized usage baskets (German Federal Statistical Agency, 
2006). The markets reflect four different consumer types: rare, low, average and heavy users. 
The allocation of tariffs to markets was performed with a standardized algorithm, checked by 
hand, and subjected to extensive robustness tests. This is described in detail in the Appendix. 
Variables 
We do not directly observe competitive pressure – this would require data on perception, e.g. 
from interviews with managers (Porac et al., 1995). In Figure 1 this is indicated by the dashed 
boxes. Instead, we observe three elements in the model via archival data: rival actions, firm type 
and the resulting competitive moves. This approach is supported by Chen et al. (2007) who find 
perceptual measures of competitive tension to be closely related to „objective‟ archival measures. 
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Our basic unit of observation is a firm‟s activity in each market and month. A firm is 
considered to have made a competitive move if at least one new tariff is introduced in a given 
month and market.  
Action Magnitude. The dependent variable, action magnitude, is measured as the number of 
tariffs introduced by a firm in a given month and market. This simple measure allows us to 
capture the two central characteristics of action magnitude: the effort of implementation and the 
targeted impact for competitors. A firms‟ first introduction of tariffs when it enters the market is 
not counted, as it cannot be considered a „reaction‟.5 
Challenger Actions. The first of our two main independent variables is the number of actions 
by rival firms that are classified as challengers. It is measured as the number of tariffs introduced 
by all challengers (except the focal firm) in the market in question since the focal firm‟s last 
tariff introduction in that market. Given our focus on the buildup of competitive pressure this 
measure is designed as a „stock‟ measure as opposed to the „flow‟ measures – e.g. a moving 
average of rival activity – commonly found in the competitive dynamics literature (Young et al., 
1996; Hsieh and Chen, 2010). 
Incumbent Actions. Our second main independent variable is the number of actions by 
incumbent rivals. It is measured as the number of tariffs introduced by all incumbents (except the 
focal firm) in the market in question since the focal firm‟s last tariff introduction in that market 
(again a stock measure). We drop incumbent actions on the same network as the focal firm to 
adress two industry-specific concerns about the data discussed in more detail below. 
Incumbent. This is a dummy variable for the firms‟ type, coded 1 for incumbents. 
Fixed Effects. To account for the panel data structure and unobserved, time-invariant 
differences we include fixed-effects dummies for markets and firms. To account for seasonal 
effects we also include fixed-effects dummies for the months of the year. 
                                                 
5
 Results would not change qualitatively if we included these. 
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Econometric Analysis 
Our dependent variable is limited to positive integers. Therefore OLS is inappropriate as it 
assumes the dependent variable to be continuous and unbounded. The standard regression model 
for positive, discrete-valued data is a Poisson model (Greve, 2003; Keil et al., 2008; Li, 2008). 
However, in a standard Poisson distribution mean and variance are equal, whereas in our data the 
variance of action magnitude is almost four times the mean (  ̂ = 0.389 and  ^  = 1.478) 
indicating severe overdispersion. The main cause of the overdispersion is a large number of zero 
counts and we therefore use a zero-inflated Poisson model (Lambert, 1992; Winkelmann, 2003). 
Vuong tests between the two models (not reported) indicate that the zero-inflated model is a 
substantial improvement over the standard model. The sample size is easily large enough to 
warrant use of this type of model, and graphical analysis showed residuals to be approximately 
normally distributed, indicating that it provided an appropriate fit. Robustness tests using 
negative binomial, standard Poisson and OLS models are reported below.   
The zero-inflated Poisson model is a nested model including a logit („inflation‟) model to 
account for zeros in excess of what would be predicted by a normal Poisson, and conditional on 
that a Poisson model. We estimate the model using interaction terms and fixed-effects: 
                                                                         
On the left hand side            )⁄ ) for the inflation model, where   is the probability 
of observing an excess zero. For the Poisson model        ), where   is the mean of the 
Poisson distribution. On the right hand side,         and         are the number of actions in 
market j by all incumbents and challengers (respectively) except firm i between the current 
month t and month  , when firm i last introduced a tariff in market j.      is the dummy variable 
indicating firm i‟s type, and the interaction terms are specified by multiplying      with the main 
independent variables. The interaction terms allow us to assess if the slopes of the reaction to 
actions by rival incumbents and challengers on a firm‟s action magnitude differ depending on 
which group the firm belongs to itself. They thus constitute a formal test of Hypotheses 2 and 3: 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the marginal effect of              on action magnitude is positive, 
so that the effect of rival incumbents‟ actions is stronger if the focal firm is an incumbent. 
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Hypothesis 3 posits that the marginal effect of              on action magnitude is negative. Z 
indicates fixed effects dummies,   and   are regression coefficients, and   is an error term. 
Controls for Wholesale Pricing and Corporate Policy 
We address two industry-specific issues related to the connection between challengers‟ action 
magnitude and previous actions by incumbents. They concern the potential influence on our 
results of wholesale prices and subsidiaries. 
The concern about wholesale prices is related to the challengers‟ dependency on the 
incumbents‟ infrastructure. The incumbents in this market are vertically integrated: they both sell 
cellular telephone services and operate their own physical networks (i.e. transmission masts, 
fixed-line backbones and switches). In contrast, challengers do not own or operate infrastructure. 
Instead, they buy airtime wholesale from the incumbents and rebundle them into new tariffs. The 
concern is that a change in wholesale prices by an incumbent would imply a change in input 
prices for all the challengers operating on its network. This could make it necessary for the 
challengers to introduce new tariffs, and an incumbent might anticipate this change by 
introducing new tariffs of its own. In the data, this would appear to be an exchange of 
competitive actions (incumbent lowers prices, challengers react by lowering prices as well) 
rather than supply-side input price adjustment. 
The second concern is that some of the challengers and incumbents belong to the same 
corporation, e.g. Base (challenger) and E-Plus (incumbent). Although the challengers are 
generally legally independent subsidiaries that service low-usage markets under a separate brand 
it is conceivable that they might be acting in concert with the relevant incumbent, thereby biasing 
our results. Note that challengers and incumbents belonging to the same corporation always 
operate on the same network. 
We address these concerns by dropping previous actions by incumbents on the same network 
as the focal firm for the calculation of the independent variables. We thus use only tariff 
introductions by incumbents on a different network, ensuring that neither changes in wholesale 
prices nor corporation-wide policies influence our results. Note that if the focal firm is an 
incumbent the problems do not arise, as incumbents always operate on their own networks. 
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RESULTS 
Main Results 
Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics and correlations for the dependent and main 
independent variables. We observe a total of 819 tariffs offered by 38 companies in four market 
segments for 45 months. Overall, this results in 2,105 firm-month-market observations (note that 
not all firms were active in all markets in all months). The correlations between the independent 
variables are mild, indicating that multicollinearity is not a major concern. Further 
multicollinearity tests are reported below. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 AROUND HERE  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 3 reports our main regression results and marginal effects. Model (1) is a baseline 
model without interaction terms, Model (2) contains our main regression. The two nested models 
of the zero-inflated Poisson model are shown in the upper and lower parts of the table. The lower 
part of the table reports the logit („inflation‟) model estimating the likelihood of excess zeros and 
the upper part of the table shows the results of a standard Poisson model.   -tests indicate that 
all models have explanatory power (p = 0.000). The coefficient estimates for the fixed- and time-
effects dummies are not reported.
6
 
Both the logit and Poisson models are generalized linear models and the regression 
coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects as in linear models (Norton et al., 2004; 
Hoetker, 2007). We calculate average marginal effects for each independent variable and report 
them for Models (1) and (2) in columns ME(1) and ME(2), respectively.
7
  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                                 
6
 Results are available from the authors. 
7
 Using a Monte-Carlo simulation to calculate the marginal effects for our main model over a range of covariate 
values as suggested by Zelner (2009) yields qualitatively similar results.  
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Hypothesis 1 [H1] predicts that action magnitude is positively related to the number of 
previous competitor actions. This is partially supported by the results in Table 3: the marginal 
effects in our main model ME(2) are positive and significant for challengers‟ actions but 
negative and significant for incumbents‟ actions. This implies that whereas a greater number of 
previous moves by challengers is associated with greater action magnitude, more previous moves 
by incumbents reduce action magnitude. This surprising result is analyzed in more detail below. 
According to our second hypothesis [H2] incumbent action magnitude is more strongly 
influenced by previous incumbents‟ actions than by challengers‟ actions. This is supported by the 
marginal effects reported in ME(2): the marginal effect of an increase in the interaction term 
between the incumbent dummy and challenger actions is negative and significant. This indicates 
that previous moves by challengers influence incumbents‟ action magnitude less strongly than 
they do challengers‟ action magnitude. 
Hypothesis 3 [H3] argues that challengers are more strongly influenced by challengers‟ 
actions than incumbents‟ actions. This too is supported by the results in ME(2): The marginal 
effect of the interaction between the incumbent dummy and incumbent actions is positive and 
significant at the 10% level. We conclude that previous moves by incumbents influence 
incumbents‟ action magnitude more strongly than challengers‟ action magnitude. 
As more rival actions cause firms to make greater moves in response, one might expect the 
number of tariffs in the market to spiral upwards, suggesting a „red queen‟ effect (Barnett and 
Sorenson, 2002). However, the marginal effects in our models are all well below one, so the 
effect of additional moves on action magnitude is rapidly dampened. This is consistent with the 
overall pattern in the data, as the average number of tariffs introduced per firm-market-month is 
approximately constant from 2006 through 2009 (averages of 0.9440 and 1.141 respectively). 
Split Samples 
Although our first hypothesis is partially supported – previous challenger actions are 
associated with larger action magnitude – the negative marginal effect of incumbent actions on 
action magnitude runs contrary to expectations. To further analyze this result we split our data 
into two subsets that are analyzed separately: one includes only incumbents‟ reactions, the other 
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only challengers‟ reactions as dependent variable. For each of the subsets we estimate a zero-
inflated Poisson model. The models are defined as above except that we drop the incumbent 
dummy and interaction terms as explanatory variables as these make no sense for split samples. 
Table 4 reports the regression results for the split sample regressions, only for challengers‟ 
reactions in Model (3) and only incumbents‟ reactions in Model (4). As before the upper (lower) 
panel reports the result of the Poisson (inflation) model, and the marginal effects for Models (3) 
and (4) are reported in columns ME(3) and ME(4), respectively. 
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE  
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
The results in Table 4 shed light on the counterintuitive negative coefficient in the main 
model. In ME(4) we see that for incumbents the effects are consistent with both Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 3: Incumbents‟ action magnitude is positively influenced by previous incumbent 
actions (the marginal effect of incumbent actions is positive and significant) and there is no 
significant effect of previous challenger moves on incumbent action magnitude. 
For challengers‟ action magnitude the results are slightly different: The results in column 
ME(3) indicate that challengers‟ action magnitude is significantly positively related to previous 
moves by challengers (coefficient positive and significant), but negatively related to previous 
moves by incumbents (coefficient negative and significant). These results suggest the data 
supports our main proposition that action magnitude is influenced by previous rival actions, but 
it seems that there is an additional effect at work: the more incumbent actions observed by 
challengers, the smaller their action magnitude. We interpret this as challengers adopting a wait-
and-see strategy in our empirical setting: when there is a lot of incumbent action they reduce 
their activity. This also provides additional support for the intuition in H2 and H3 that strategic 
groups matter for competitive reactions to multiple rivals. 
Robustness Tests 
We report a number of robustness test including tests for multicollinearity, inclusion of 
incumbent tariffs on the same network, and alternative model specifications. 
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Multicollinearity. Although the correlations between the independent variables reported in 
Table 2 are mild, the firm fixed-effects are highly correlated with the dummy variable      by 
construction: each firm is either an incumbent or a challenger. This induces high 
multicollinearity when firm fixed effects are included. Dropping the firm fixed effects in Model 
(4) does not change our results but does significantly reduce multicollinearity, resulting in 
variance inflation factors below 2.39 and a condition number for the covariance matrix of 10.24. 
The results are also robust to randomly dropping 5% of the observations. Together, these tests 
indicate that multicollinearity is not a major concern (Belsley et al., 1980). 
Incumbent tariffs on same network. The second robustness test checks that excluding 
incumbent tariffs introduced on the same network does not bias our results. Including the 
incumbent tariffs introduced on the same network in the models does not substantially change 
our results: In Model (4) the results are identical in sign and significance. 
Alternative model specifications. To ensure our results in Model (4) are not due to specifics 
of the zero-inflated Poisson model we check our results against several alternative model 
specifications, including negative binomial, standard Poisson, and OLS specifications. 
First, although the dependent variable is limited to positive integers we check our results 
against a simple OLS regression. The results are unchanged, except that the coefficient for 
             is no longer significantly different from zero. Dropping the many zero 
observations for the OLS model does not change this result. Using an OLS model for the split 
samples including zero observations also does not change the results. 
Second, our results are robust to using a negative binomial model or a standard Poisson 
model. For the full sample using the two models the marginal effects are identical except that the 
confidence level for the              coefficient is slightly above 10% (p<0.107 for the 
negative binomial and p<0.121 for the Poisson), whereas the coefficient for              is 
significant at the 1% level in both models. The results of the split sample models are fully robust 
to using either a negative binomial or a standard Poisson model. 
Third, we control for the potential influence of market entry and exit by challengers (the 
group of incumbents remains stable throughout). We do so by running a Poisson regression of 
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challengers‟ actions         on the number of challengers in the market and using the residuals 
instead of         in Model (2). The results remain unchanged, except that the marginal effect 
for incumbent actions         is no longer significantly different from zero (p<0.142). 
DISCUSSION 
Competitive dynamics research has studied the exchange of competitive actions and 
responses between rival firms by focusing on action-reaction dyads (Smith et al., 2001; 
Hutzschenreuter and Israel, 2009). This has allowed researchers to study how firms react to 
specific actions by individual rivals (Chen and Miller 1994), but not on how firms react to their 
competitors as a group. Our study provides an early step to closing this gap by examining how 
firms react to multiple rival actions. Based on the awareness-motivation-capability framework 
we develop the concept of competitive pressure to describe the mechanism by which firms 
perceive and respond to actions by one or several rivals. We use strategic group theory to predict 
that firms react more strongly to their strategic equals, which we feel is an important nuance to 
our work: Firms may not react just to individual firms, but they are unlikely to consider all 
market participants equally important. Instead, they react to moves within their strategic group. 
We first propose that firms observing more rival actions make larger competitive moves due 
to increased competitive pressure. Our empirical findings are consistent with this: we find 
evidence that firms' action magnitude is positively influenced by previous actions by rivals from 
their own strategic group. This suggests that firms do react to multiple rivals as a group, 
supporting our main argument. A surprising result that runs contrary to our expectations is that 
challengers‟ action magnitude is negatively influenced by previous incumbent actions. We 
attribute this to a wait-and-see strategy.  
We then examine the moderating influence of strategic group on competitive pressure. We 
argue that managers experience greater competitive pressure when they observe actions by 
competitors that are similar to themselves (Chen, 1996; Young et al., 2000; Chen et al., 2007), 
and that this manifests itself in greater action magnitude. The data also supports this prediction: 
Challengers‟ action magnitude is influenced more strongly by the number of challengers‟ actions 
than by the number of incumbents‟ actions, and vice versa. This suggests that strategic groups do 
matter in firms‟ perception of competitive moves by groups of rivals. 
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Our study contributes to competitive dynamics research by investigating the previously 
neglected question of how firms respond to actions by multiple competitors (the only exception 
being Hsieh and Chen, 2010). The concept of competitive pressure allows us to relax the strong 
assumptions implicit in the action-reaction dyad. It also lets us generalize the promising concept 
of competitive tension between two firms to the relationship between a firm and multiple rivals 
(Chen et al., 2007). It is broadly supported by the data and thus provides additional support for a 
perspective of competitive dynamics founded in managerial perception (Marcel et al., 2011). 
Our research is related to a recent study by Hsieh and Chen (2010) that investigates the 
relationship between a firm and multiple rivals. We extend and complement their study in two 
ways. First, we propose and discuss the mechanism of competitive pressure to explain why firms 
take competitive action in response to multiple rivals‟ actions. Second, we offer a different 
perspective on rival actions: whereas Hsieh and Chen follow the classical literature in using a 
„flow‟ measure of rival activity we focus on the buildup of competitive pressure by using a 
„stock‟ measure of competitive actions. 
Managerial Implications 
Our results have several implications for managers deciding on strategic moves in 
competitive environments. First, they suggest that it may be worthwhile to monitor rival firms 
even if they have been inactive for some time. If an inactive rival firm observes a large number 
actions accumulating in the market, its competitive pressure is likely to grow, leading to a large 
action. Knowing what has happened in the market since a rival‟s last competitive move can alert 
managers to a potential major move in the future.  
Second, when planning actions managers should screen rivals that are strategically similar to 
their own firm with particular care, as it is they who are most likely to respond. 
Finally, firms have been shown to benefit from small, late or missing reactions to their 
competitive moves (Chen and MacMillan, 1992; Smith et al., 2001). Our findings suggest that to 
minimize rivals‟ reactions firms should not draw undue attention to its own and others‟ actions. 
The likely efficacy of this strategy will depend on the level of market transparency however. 
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Limitations and Future Directions 
Our study has several limitations. First, we do not directly observe competitive pressure using 
archival data. Future research would benefit from directly measuring managers‟ perception of 
actions by multiple rivals in the market, similar to recent studies on perception of pairs of rivals 
(Chen et al., 2007; Marcel et al., 2011; Kilduff et al., 2010). This might also allow researchers to 
investigate the relative importance for competitive pressure of individual rivals‟ actions as 
compared to the sum of multiple rivals‟ actions. 
Second, we used a simple dichotomous distinction between incumbents and challengers to 
identify strategic groups. Future research may benefit from using more fine-grained measures to 
identify strategic group membership (Hatten and Hatten, 1987). We also studied only one type of 
action, tariff setting, and only action magnitude as an important attribute of competitive moves. 
While tariff setting is the most important competitive action in mobile telephony, future research 
using other strategic variables (e.g. advertising) may give a more complete view of competitive 
action in this industry. Finally, we could not explicitly link firm behavior to performance.  
As discussed we used a „stock‟ measure of rival actions in contrast to the common „flow‟ 
measures of rival activity. Comparing the relative effects of stock and flow measures of rival 
activity on competitive pressure and firm behavior may be an interesting avenue for future work. 
In summary, our study is an early attempt to extend our understanding of competitive 
behavior by relaxing the assumptions underlying the action-reaction dyad. We hope that future 
work will extend these results to advance our understanding of rivalry between multiple firms. 
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APPENDIX A – MAIN TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Proposed Relationships 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
(1) Action Magnitude 0.39 1.48 0 18 
(2) Challengers' Actions (CA) 13.42 14.93 0 112 
(3) Incumbents' Actions (IA) 13.75 21.33 0 187 
(4) Incumbent (dummy) 0.34 - 0 1 
(5) Incumbent x CA 2.48 7.19 0 67 
(6) Incumbent x IA 2.93 7.25 0 67 
  N = 2105       
 
 
Table 2: Correlation Table 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Action Magnitude 1     
(2) Challengers' Actions (CA) -0.063* 1    
(3) Incumbents' Actions (IA) -0.007 0.559* 1   
(4) Incumbent (dummy) 0.227* -0.298* -0.176* 1  
(5) Incumbent x CA 0.122* 0.229* -0.010 0.479* 1 
(6) Incumbent x IA 0.259* -0.062* 0.135* 0.560* 0.486* 
  N = 2105         
Asterisks mark correlations that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
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Table 3: Full Sample Regression Models 
Action Magnitude Regression Coefficients Marginal Effects 
    (1) (2) (ME1) (ME2) 
Conditional Poisson Model     
 Challengers' Actions (CA) -0.006 0.032*** 0.007** 0.010** 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) 
 Incumbents' Actions (IA) -0.013*** -0.023** 0.004* -0.010*** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) 
 Incumbent 3.800*** 1.680 0.776 0.531 
  (1.431) (1.989) (0.975) (0.543) 
 Incumbent x CA  -0.041***  -0.016*** 
   (0.012)  (0.005) 
 Incumbent x IA  0.018**  0.007* 
   (0.009)  (0.004) 
 Constant -2.093 -0.136   
    (1.455) (2.015)     
Inflation Model     
 Challengers' Actions (CA) -0.040** 0.011   
  (0.017) (0.019)   
 Incumbents' Actions (IA) -0.039*** 0.002   
  (0.011) (0.014)   
 Incumbent 2.892 0.500   
  (5.304) (1.732)   
 Incumbent x CA  -0.036   
   (0.024)   
 Incumbent x IA  -0.064***   
   (0.017)   
 Constant 0.899 -1.483   
    (5.338) (0.790)     
Fixed Effects     
 Firms yes yes   
 Markets yes yes   
 Years yes yes   
  Seasons (months) yes yes     
 Observations 2,105 2,105   
 Chi-squared statistic 556.9 536.21   
 Model test (Chi-squared) 0.000 0.000   
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Split Sample Regression Models 
Action Magnitude     
  
  
Challengers 
(3) 
Incumbents 
(4) 
Marginal 
Effects 
Challengers 
(ME3) 
Marginal 
Effects 
Incumbents 
(ME4) 
Conditional Poisson Model     
 Challengers' Actions (CA) 0.003 -0.006 0.005*** 0.011 
  (0.011) (0.008) (0.002) (0.013) 
 Incumbents' Actions (IA) -0.006 -0.003 -0.005*** 0.027*** 
  (0.010) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) 
 Constant 0.414 1.200**   
    (0.721) (0.328)     
Inflation Model     
 Challengers' Actions (CA) -0.073*** -0.028   
  (0.022) (0.026)   
 Incumbents' Actions (IA) 0.056** -0.050***   
  (0.026) (0.012)   
 Constant -10.604 1.396***   
    (563.7) (0.523)     
Fixed Effects     
 Firms no no   
 Markets yes yes   
 Years yes yes   
  Seasons (months) yes no     
 Observations 1,385 720     
 Chi-squared statistic 121.41 185.02   
 Model test (Chi-squared) 0.000 0.000   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
  
 32 
APPENDIX B – SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL 
Allocation of Tariffs to Markets 
Initially, the dataset lacked a segmentation of the tariff market although tariffs were 
obviously targeted at different consumer segments, e.g. occasional callers and heavy usage 
business consumers. Treating all tariffs as competing equally for the same consumers would 
skew our results, so we allocated each tariff to a unique market segment (subsequently referred 
to simply as „market‟). This is achieved using three standard usage baskets defined by the 
German Federal Statistical Agency (2006) for „rare‟, „low‟ and „average‟ cellular phone users. 
No basket was available for business users, so we defined a „heavy‟ user basket as an inflated 
version of the average user basket. The baskets are provided in Table B1. 
Each tariff was allocated to a unique basket („market‟) with the following procedure: 
1. Calculate the monthly cost of each tariff for each of the four user baskets 
using the tariff components and the usage pattern for the baskets. 
2. Using all tariffs, identify the lower 10%-ile in terms of cost for each user 
basket by month. 
3. Calculate the relative distance of each tariff’s cost to the lower cost 
percentile for each user basket in the month it was introduced. 
4. Allocate each tariff to the basket where the relative distance is smallest. 
In calculating the monthly cost we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we take assume 
calls are distributed evenly over the day. In the period covered by our dataset a decreasing 
number of tariffs differentiate between different times of day ; where different rates were offered 
we used the average cost. Second, if off-net prices varied for different providers we used the 
average off-net price. This affected only a minor percentage of the tariffs in the sample.  
The results of the tariff allocation for average monthly user bills are provided in Table B2. A 
potential weakness of the market allocation procedure is that the user baskets were only available 
for 2000. In the time between then and the end of our dataset there may have been changes in 
usage patterns arising endogenously from increasing diffusion and falling prices. 
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The allocation was robust towards a wide range of inflation factors for the heavy user basket 
and towards using fiscal quarters rather than months to define the lower cost quartile. Results 
were also robust towards using lower percentiles between 5% and 15%. The 10%-ile level was 
chosen because it yielded the most plausible allocation based on a qualitative investigation of 
tariff names. The lists allocating the tariffs to the markets are available on request from the 
authors. 
Table B1: Tariff Allocation 
Results of Tariff Allocation to Markets 
Observations and average monthly user bill in EUR 
 Market Obs. Mean* SD* Min* Max* 
Rare 162 8.89 4.66 2.00 24.54 
Low 163 36.61 8.26 15.45 56.00 
Average 173 56.80 15.42 26.00 102.73 
Heavy 321 126.05 45.43 9.00 308.25 
* Units = EUR / month    
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Table B2: Usage baskets 
Usage in minutes  
(monthly values calculated on basis of German Federal Network Authority‟s baskets of 
2000) 
Assumption: Call duration constant over different types 
 Unit 
Rare  
users 
Low-level 
users 
Average 
users Heavy users* 
Total duration of calls min 20 60 200 600 
   o/w to own network min 7 27 69 207 
   o/w to other network min 4 9 40 120 
   o/w to fixed-line min 9 24 91 273 
SMS # 20 60 60 180 
 
* Note: No basket was available for heavy users, therefore two assumptions were made: 
- Call distribution is assumed to be identical to average users. 
- Total call duration is assumed to be 600 min (30min x 20 working days) 
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Data Cleaning 
The data gathered by Teltarif was subjected to extensive cleaning at the provider and tariff 
levels. 
Providers. Non-mobile operators, e.g. a data-service company offering tariffs as an add-on 
for companies implementing software solutions were excluded from the dataset. Furthermore, 22 
providers which each introduced only a single tariff in one month and market were dropped for 
the calculation of the dependent variable, as these tariff introductions cannot seriously be 
considered reactions. Three providers who had only a few tariffs and for whom no information 
could be found on the internet were also dropped from the dataset. Finally, seventeen tariff 
resellers were dropped, as discussed in detail in the paper. 
Tariffs. The following tariffs were dropped to avoid distortions in price calculations and the 
calculated number of new tariffs: Bundles including a mobile tariff and DSL (broadband) access, 
bundles including a mobile tariff and a fixed-line tariff, add-on options for tariffs (such as „Extra 
100 free SMS‟), and pure data tariffs for mobile devices (without calling functionality),  
Note that tariffs are also influenced by firms‟ strategy of attracting new consumers by 
subsidizing mobile handsets, and subsequently recovering their investment over the duration of 
the tariff contract. While we cannot control for this effect due to a lack of data on handset 
subsidies, we argue that a new tariff constructed to subsidize a particular handset does constitute 
a competitive move.  
 
